MEDAN, North Sumatra (JP): The report on illegal logging in this newspaper of June 18 on Aceh's Gunung Leuser National Park titled "An unending battle against illegal logging," was right on the mark. Except that the article by Tertiani Z.B. Simanjuntak should probably have been titled "an unbegun battle."

Because of illegal logging Leuser National Park, one of the world's most important remaining rain forests, is disappearing. To combat this illegal logging, starting in 1994 the European Union and the Indonesian government began feeding money, approximately US$30 million over seven years, to fund the mammoth task.

Some of us who knew the expatriate staff and heard their stories have wondered when someone would look seriously at this project and sing, "Where has all the money gone? What benefits have accrued to the local population? How many hectares of forest have been saved or will be saved each year?" This is more than an ecological tragedy. It is yet another story of millions of dollars squandered, mismanaged or worse.

One of the prime objectives of this project was to have been the development of ecotourism as an alternative source of income, so residents wouldn't need to cut trees to sell to businessmen and military lords. Aceh is one of most beautiful places in the world. With its jungles and forest and mountains and beaches it is an ecotourist's dream. This ecotourism project should have trained and created permanent jobs for hundreds of people living within the park or providing support services. Instead it has gone through its first seven-year, $30 million stage, and what is there to show for it? What were the original goals, and what has been attained?

To be fair we must take Aceh's "troubles" into account. No project has escaped the effects of Aceh's war, and the Leuser Development Program suffered the loss of several volunteers and had to close field offices because of the deteriorating security situation. But from the beginning there were things about this project that raised eyebrows. First: While the project was meant to be centered in Kutacane within Leuser Park, the expatriate technical experts preferred to live closer to urban pleasures and demanded homes in Medan.

Soon the project rented office space in Medan, paying more in rent than was being paid by any other tenant for similar facilities lies in Medan at the time. Then the megavehicles arrived from Europe -- but only after millions of pre-krismon (monetary crisis) rupiah in ransom money was paid quietly to the Customs officials.

Worst of all, the fabled ecotourism never seemed to happen, not even in the four years before violence blanketed Aceh. Facilities were developed at two locations on the Alas River to accommodate rafting groups, but those who used them found significant deficiencies.

Recommendations for changes which were given to the ecotourism planner were, it appeared, ignored. The ecotourism planner was employed by the project as a local hire on the basis of his illegally purchased Indonesian citizenship and Islamic name, then hurriedly dismissed in mid-1998 when Medan's immigration corruption became a public issue.

This may seem irrelevant, but it illustrates the project's way of doing things. There were entertaining stories of the project's ecosystem management strategy: pay what we must to the local military chiefs for security, and negotiate with them about which areas they could continue to log and which they would leave alone along the riverbanks so the rafting tourists would see trees and not bare ground. Indonesian staff, too, have their anecdotes to tell. But who cares to hear them?

Mentioning these things in this newspaper will be considered by some to be a worse violation of a taboo than was the collusion with illegal loggers or other dubious practices. Yet the practises were discussed openly in Medan by those connected to the project. People will prattle freely, but won't bring their complaints to those with authority to redress the problems, for fear of rocking the boat and losing their contracts. This project had a large staff, a huge amount of money, superior technical equipment, and international consultants coming and going.

What explains the poor results? Who will explain to the Indonesians who are footing part of the bill for this, and paying again in lost opportunity costs? According to Tertiani's article, in the wake of this withered Save-the-Rain forest project the EU is contemplating spending another 2 million euros to establish an illegal-logging response center. If the authorities aren't responding now, how will this initiative change that?

Might it be more productive just to take the money and give it to the police as an incentive to do what they should be doing now, arresting illegal loggers and exporters? How will the EU ensure that new funds will produce better results than the last $30 million?

One wonders: By proposing an extended project are EU officials trying to protect the forest, or their own positions? Before implementing another money-consuming plan that gives the illusion that Leuser National Park is being protected, how about getting to the bottom of the problems in the current project.